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Abstract		In	2014,	at	the	height	of	gamergate	hostilities,	a	blockbot	was	developed	and	circulated	within	the	gaming	community	 that	allowed	subscribers	 to	automatically	block	upwards	of	8,000	Twitter	ac-counts.	“Ggautoblocker,”	as	it	was	called,	was	designed	to	insulate	subscribers’	Twitter	feeds	from	hurtful,	sexist,	and	in	some	cases	deeply	disturbing	comments.	In	doing	so	it	cast	a	wide	net	and	be-came	a	source	of	considerable	criticism	from	many	in	the	industry	and	games	community.	During	this	time,	the	International	Game	Developers	Association	(IGDA)	2015	Video	Game	Developer	Satis-faction	Survey	was	circulating,	resulting	in	a	host	of	comments	on	the	blockbot	from	workers	in	the	industry.	In	this	paper	we	analyze	these	responses,	which	constitute	some	of	the	first	empirical	data	on	a	public	response	to	the	use	of	autoblocking	technology,	to	consider	the	broader	implications	of	the	algorithmic	structuring	of	the	online	public	sphere.	First,	we	emphasize	the	important	role	that	ggautoblocker,	and	similar	autoblocking	tools,	play	in	creating	space	for	marginalized	voices	online.	Then,	 we	 turn	 to	 our	 findings,	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 overwhelmingly	 negative	 response	 to	 ggau-toblocker	reflects	underlying	anxieties	about	 fragmenting	control	over	 the	structure	of	 the	online	public	sphere	and	online	public	life.	In	our	discussion,	we	reflect	upon	what	the	negative	responses	suggest	 about	 normative	 expectations	 of	 participation	 in	 the	 online	 public	 sphere,	 and	 how	 this	contrasts	with	the	realities	of	algorithmically	structured	online	spaces.		
Keywords	public	sphere,	counter	publics,	videogames,	algorithms,	social	media		 	
Introduction		In	2014,	a	maelstrom	of	infighting	shook	the	videogame	industry.	Better	known	as	gamergate,	this	conflict	ostensibly	emerged	from	concerns	over	ethics	in	games	journalism.	However,	it	quickly	de-volved	into	a	transparently	misogynistic	campaign	of	abuse,	specifically	targeting	outspoken	female	video	 game	 developers,	 critics,	 and	 journalists.	 Harvey	 &	 Shepherd	 (2016)	 argue	 that	 “if	 the	#GamerGate	 controversy	 indicates	anything	about	 […]	 the	 contemporary	context	of	 technological	spheres	of	production,	it	is	that	the	increased	visibility	of	women	is	not	necessarily	welcome”	(p.4).	At	the	height	of	the	controversy,	Randi	Harper,	a	computer	engineer	in	San	Francisco,	designed	the	“Good	Game	autoblocker”	(henceforth,	ggautoblocker).	This	autoblocker	was	designed	to	auto-
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mate	the	process	of	blocking	Twitter	accounts	connected	to	“some	of	the	worst	offenders	in	the	re-cent	wave	of	 harassment”	 (IGDA,	n.d.)	The	bot	 cross-referenced	 the	 followers	of	 five	of	 the	most	vocal	 pro-gamergate	 supporters.	 If	 a	 Twitter	 account	was	 found	 to	 be	 following	 two	 or	more	 of	those	accounts,	 they	were	then	included	on	the	blocklist.	When	a	user	subscribed	to	the	blocklist,	the	bot	automatically	blocked	those	accounts.	The	International	Game	Developers	Association	post-ed	a	 link	to	the	blockbot	 in	 the	Mental	Wellness	and	Self	Care	section	of	 their	Online	Harassment	Resources	webpage.	 The	 linked	 text	 read:	 “A	 third-party	 Twitter	 tool	 developed	 to	 quickly	mass	block	 some	of	 the	worst	 offenders	 in	 a	 recent	wave	of	 harassment	 and	 also	 accounts	 that	 follow	those	offenders”	(Young,	2014).			In	the	end,	the	bot	was	a	discursive	sledgehammer,	effectively	shutting	out	between	8,000	and	10,000	 accounts	 from	 subscribers’	 Twitter	 feeds.	 In	 essence,	 ggautoblocker,	 and	 blockbots	more	generally,	are	ways	of	curating	comments	and	content	on	social	media.	The	intention	behind	Har-per’s	ggautoblocker	was	to	free	users’	Twitter	feeds	from	hurtful,	sexist,	and	in	some	cases	deeply	disturbing	comments.	Despite	 the	 intention	 to	 insulate	subscribers	 from	harmful	content	without	actually	preventing	others	from	posting,	ggautoblocker	was	widely	disparaged	and	became	a	source	of	criticism	for	many	in	the	industry,	as	well	as	the	games	community	more	broadly.	Using	qualitative	responses	from	the	International	Game	Developers	Association’s	(IGDA)	2015	Developer	Satisfaction	Survey,	this	paper	unpacks	the	reaction	of	video	game	developers	to	this	au-toblocker,	 as	 a	 means	 to	 explore	 the	 potential	 implications	 of	 autoblocking	 technology	 for	 the	online	public	sphere.	We	argue	that	the	story	of	ggautoblocker	is	rife	with	significant	contradictions.	First,	we	reflect	upon	the	important	role	that	ggautoblocker,	and	similar	autoblocking	tools,	play	in	creating	 space	 for	 marginalized	 voices	 online.	 Then,	 we	 turn	 to	 our	 findings,	 wherein	 the	 over-whelmingly	 negative	 response	 to	 the	 blockbot	 reflects	 underlying	 anxieties	 about	 shifts	 in	 the	structure	of	the	online	public	sphere	and	online	public	life.	In	conclusion,	we	reflect	upon	what	the	negative	 response	 suggests	 about	 normative	 expectations	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 in	 algorithmically	structured	online	spaces.		
Background	
	Social	media	platforms	and	the	public	discussions	they	facilitate	are	often	framed	as	central	to	the	contemporary	public	sphere.	Their	networked,	non-hierarchical	structure	has	been	celebrated	for	enabling	participation	and	 interactivity	at	a	scale	that	would	have	been	unthinkable	only	decades	ago	(Castells,	2010;	2012;	Shirky,	2008).		However,	 recent	 and	 troubling	 reports	 of	 online	 gender-based	 abuse,	 such	 as	 that	which	 took	place	during	gamergate,	act	as	a	stark	reminder	that	not	everyone	is	equally	empowered	to	partici-pate	online	 (Jenson	&	De	Castell,	2013).	For	example,	 in	response	 to	 feminist	cultural	critic	Anita	Sarkeesian’s	advocacy	for	a	more	inclusive	videogame	culture,	she	received	a	series	of	threatening,	misogynistic,	and	abusive	tweets,	her	social	media	accounts	were	hacked	and	defamed,	sockpuppet	accounts	were	made	in	her	name,	and	threats	to	her	physical	and	personal	safety	forced	her	to	can-cel	speaking	events	and	temporarily	 leave	her	home	(Valenti,	2015;	Dewey,	2014).	This	 is	simply	one	example,	but	 it	 illustrates	the	way	that	women’s	voices	can	be	silenced	and	their	 full	engage-ment	discouraged	via	the	same	tools	often	lauded	to	facilitate	participatory	parity	(Mantilla	2013,	2015;	 Jane,	 2014).	 “Given	 the	 contestation	 of	 women’s	 participation	 within	 digital	 games,	 [and	online	spaces],	it	is	important	to	consider	how	[initiatives	like	ggautoblocker]	are	understood	and	negotiated”	(Harvey	&	Shepherd,	2016,	p.4).		These	kinds	of	experiences	reflect	the	perceived	necessity	of	the	blockbot	at	the	time	of	its	crea-tion.	Twitter’s	official	 response	 to	 the	gender-based	abuse	during	gamergate	was	underwhelming	
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and	failed	to	curb	abusive	behavior	and	protect	women	online.	Though	Twitter	did	respond	by	cre-ating	a	quick	 response	 tool,	 allegedly	making	 it	 easier	 to	 report	harmful	or	abusive	 tweets,	 these	efforts	had	little	impact	on	actually	shielding	users	from	online	vitriol	(Davis,	2014;	Warzel,	2016).	With	 few	options	 for	 recourse	embedded	 in	 the	platforms	 themselves,	mass-blocking	 tools	act	 as	‘do	it	yourself’	solutions	that	allow	users	to	exercise	control	over	their	social	media	experience	and	insulate	 women	 from	 the	 more	 abusive	 discourse	 that	 might	 otherwise	 chill	 their	 participation	(Jane,	2016,	2017a,	2017b).	We	would	be	remiss	 to	underplay	 the	gravity	of	 this	protection,	par-ticularly	in	a	field	that	heavily	relies	on	digital	spaces	for	both	work	and	play.	During	the	height	of	gamergate,	ggautoblocker	 filtered	out	the	agitators,	shielding	women	game	developers	and	critics	from	cyber-misogyny	and	allowing	them	to	freely	participate	 in	the	discourse	in	an	already	male-dominated	field.	Beyond	this,	autoblocking	tools	are	of	theoretical	importance	because	they	introduce	dynamism	into	the	online	public	sphere	in	interesting	and	potentially	contestable	ways.	Extant	literature	sug-gests	 that	 the	 public	 sphere	 is	 not	 unitary,	 but	 characterized	 instead	 by	 competing	 and	 unequal	groups.	According	to	Nancy	Fraser	(1990),	 “subaltern	counterpublics”	require	“parallel	discursive	arenas”	to	define	what’s	 important	to	them,	find	their	voice,	and	generally	practice	collective	self-determination	 so	 that	 they	 can	articulate	 and	defend	 their	 interests	 to	 a	wider	public.	We	might,	then,	 usefully	 characterize	 ggautoblocker	 as	 a	 socio-technical	 effort	 to	 restructure	 the	 discursive	arena	of	Twitter	to	facilitate	this	counterpublic	discourse	(see	Geiger,	2015,	for	a	more	detailed	ex-ploration	of	 these	 issues).	Crucially,	ggautoblocker	did	so	 in	a	way	that	does	not	necessitate	a	re-treat	from	online	spaces.	The	bot	was	not	without	its	limitations,	however.	As	we	seek	to	improve	equity	in	online	spaces,	“it	 is	essential	to	recognize	the	biases	and	assumptions	that	underpin	any	ideal	 and	 critically	 interrogate	who	benefits	 and	who	does	not”	 (Caplan	&	boyd,	 2016,	 p.15)2.	As	Caplan	and	boyd	(2016)	argue,	“No	intervention	is	without	externalities”	(p.15).			
Method		Our	 data	 comes	 from	 the	 qualitative	 responses	 in	 the	 2015	online	Developer	 Satisfaction	 Survey	(DSS)	 created	by	Dr.	 Johanna	Weststar	 and	Dr.	Marie	 Josee	Legault	 in	 association	with	 the	 IGDA.	This	annual	survey	seeks,	broadly,	to	understand	the	quality	of	life	of	video	game	developers	work-ing	in	the	industry.	The	2015	DSS	garnered	a	total	of	2,928	valid	responses.	Of	that	total,	75%	iden-tified	as	male,	22%	identified	as	female,	and	1.5%	identified	as	transgender.	As	is	the	norm	of	the	video	game	 industry,	 respondents	were	young	workers.	More	 than	half	 (51%)	of	 the	sample	was	between	the	ages	of	25-34.	The	vast	majority	of	respondents	(76%)	identified	as	white,	caucasian,	or	European,	distantly	followed	by	East	or	South-East	Asian,	at	only	9%.	In	this	paper,	we	concen-trate	 on	 a	 subset	 of	 respondents	 within	 the	 overall	 sample—those	 who	 made	 reference	 to	 the	blockbot	in	some	capacity.		Two	iterations	of	coding	took	place	to	arrive	at	the	smaller	sample	of	qualitative	comments	that	are	the	focus	of	this	paper.	First,	we	coded	every	qualitative	comment	in	the	diversity	section	of	the	survey	using	30	primary	codes	and	24	secondary	codes,	for	a	total	of	54	codes.3	These	codes	were	developed	 and	 tested	 by	 three	 researchers,	 achieving	 intercoder	 reliability.4	 Any	 differences	 be-tween	the	codes	applied	to	responses	were	discussed	and	reviewed	until	an	agreement	between	all	three	researchers	was	reached.	Over	the	course	of	this	initial	coding	process	we	noticed	that	a	cen-tral	source	of	frustration	for	many	respondents	was	external	to	their	places	of	work;	indeed,	these	frustrations	were	with	the	general	state	of	discourse	among	members	of	the	gaming	community	on	social	media,	and	within	the	gaming	and	mainstream	press.	This	discovery	led	us	to	conduct	a	se-cond	round	of	coding	using	the	primary	code	“public	discourse,”	which	included	comments	on	gam-
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ing	and	mainstream	press,	social	media	discussions,	and	the	general	public	perception	of	the	indus-try.	From	this	re-coding	it	became	clear	that	the	“ggautoblocker”	was	a	source	of	derision	and	hos-tility	among	respondents.	We	then	searched	all	the	qualitative	responses	for	the	terms	“blocklist,”	“blacklist,”	“blockbot,”	“blocked,”	“autoblock,”	and	“Randi	Harper,”	and	removed	any	responses	that	did	not	reference	the	ggautoblocker.	Using	only	this	new	list	of	comments	that	contained	mention	of	 the	ggautoblocker,	we	began	a	new	coding	process.	This	round	of	coding	revealed	three	codes,	which	are	the	central	themes	analyzed	in	this	paper.		Comments	 about	 the	 ggautoblocker	were	brought	up	174	 times	by	103	 respondents.	Of	 those	174	responses,	10%	(23)	of	comments	came	from	women,	3%	(5)	from	transgender	men	or	women,	45%	(79)	from	men,	and	41%	(72)	did	not	disclose	their	gender.	While	this	represents	only	a	frac-tion	of	total	responses,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	comments	about	ggautoblocker	were	completely	unprompted.	The	survey	itself	did	not	ask	about	the	ggautoblocker,	or	mass-blocking	tools	on	social	media.	
	
Findings		While	we	 recognize	 that,	within	 the	whole	 survey	 sample,	 responses	 that	mentioned	 the	Twitter	blockbot	were	not	 incredibly	prevalent,	we	were	struck	by	the	consistency	of	anger	with	which	it	was	discussed.	Not	a	single	discussant	reported	using	the	tool,	nor	assessed	it	positively.	As	such,	these	comments	reveal	a	perceived	transgression	among	video	game	developers	about	the	rules	of	online	debate.	This	transgression	was	articulated	in	three	primary	ways;	as	a	form	of	employment	discrimination,	as	a	 form	of	slander,	and	as	a	 form	of	censorship.	 In	this	section	we	provide	a	de-scription	of	the	three	themes	identified.	An	analysis	of	these	themes	follows	in	the	discussion	sec-tion.		
Blacklisted	from	employment			First,	13%	of	respondents		(22	comments)	expressed	fear	that	inclusion	on	the	blocklist	would	have	negative	implications	for	their	employment	prospects.	These	respondents	referred	to	ggautoblock-er	 as	 an	 “industry	blacklist.”	They	 suggested	 that	 their	 inclusion	on	 it	would	 limit	 their	 ability	 to	contact	 employers	 or	 that	 it	 would	 tarnish	 their	 reputation	 and	 discourage	 potential	 employers	from	hiring	them.	For	example,	one	respondent	said,	“The	fact	that	I	can	be	blacklisted	by	the	indus-try	for	following	a	YouTuber	that	speaks	out	against	unethical	behaviour	in	the	industry	is	insane.”	Another	 stated,	 “Most	 damaging	 of	 all	 was	 I	 tweeted	 a	 sarcastic	 tweet	 to	 some	 person	 and	was	placed	on	a	blacklist	which	.	.	.		essentially	blocked	me	from	engaging	with	prospective	jobs	oppor-tunities.”		
	
Guilty	by	association		Our	next	code	is	titled	“guilty	by	association”.	This	second	theme	captures	the	responses	that	took	issue	with	the	label	of	“harasser”	that	membership	on	the	blocklist	implied.		The	list	included	over	8,000	accounts,	many	of	whom	 followed	outspoken	and	hostile	Gamergate	advocates	but	did	not	perpetrate	harassment	themselves.	As	such	they	took	issue	with	being	placed	on	the	list	for	the	act	of	following	an	account	on	Twitter,	an	action	several	respondents	described	as	“guilt	by	association.”	Common	comments	 included	stories	of	being	 “libeled”	or	 “slandered.”	Twenty-four	percent	of	 re-sponses	(42	comments)	fell	under	this	theme.	For	example,	one	respondent	said,	“blockbots	gener-alised	over	10k	people	as	harassers	with	no	proof	what	so	ever.”	A	second	respondent	stated	they	
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had	felt	personally	persecuted	by	the	blockbot,	explaining	that	it	“blocked	people	based	on	follow-ers	not	on	actions.”	This	respondent	continues	to	explain	that	they,	“as	well	as	MANY	other	industry	professionals	were	on	that	block	list	which	was	described	by	the	IDGA	as	 ‘the	worst	harassers	on	the	internet’.	It's	disgusting.”	Finally,	another	argued	“The	block	bot	was	based	on	who	the	person	follows	on	Twitter.	 It	was	promoted	as	a	way	to	combat	online	harassment	thus	deeming	anyone	who	happens	to	follow	2	people	on	Twitter	harassers	and	that	is	simply	not	true.”		
Censorship	
	Thirdly,	and	most	consistently,	44%	of	responses	(77	comments)	from	our	subset	argued	that	the	blockbot	was	a	 form	of	censorship.	These	respondents	perceived	 the	 tool	as	hindering	 their	 free-dom	of	expression,	as	a	calculated	effort	to	suppress	ideological	and	political	difference,	and	as	lim-iting	the	potential	for	productive	debate	among	the	parties	involved.	Some	reported	self-censoring	out	of	fear,	and	others	framed	the	tool	as	“silencing	disagreeing	opinions”	or	“blockbotting	dissent,”	as	 one	 respondent	 put	 it.	 It	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 these	 claims,	 and	 the	 sense	 of	 persecution	 they	draw	upon,	share	a	clear	resemblance	with	the	rhetorical	tactics	of	what	we	have	since	come	to	un-derstand	as	the	“alt-right.”		For	example,	one	respondent	wrote:			 Again,	white	males	such	as	myself	are	demonized	in	the	games	press	daily.	We	are	told	that	we	are	on	"easy	mode."	Tell	that	to	all	the	folks	in	my	position	who	just	want	to	make	good	games.	And	how	does	the	IGDA	react	to	this?	By	sponsoring	an	industry	wide	blocklist	based	on	differences	of	political	opinion	and	guilt	by	association.		Another	said,	“As	an	organisation	[the	IGDA]	you	should	be	encouraging	open	discussion	on	top-ics	such	as	these,	not	encouraging	and	facilitating	the	wholesale	blocking	of	contrary	points	of	view	leading	to	echo	chambers	and	no	possible	hope	of	reconciliation.”		
Discussion		The	blockbot	and	resulting	outrage	raise	important	questions	about	the	public	sphere,	its	delibera-tive	 function,	and	how	social	media	 infrastructure	 informs	 the	relationship	between	 the	 two.	Our	data	offers	a	diagnostic	moment	to	 think	through	the	 implications	of	automating	and	outsourcing	the	job	of	curating	information,	and	how	this	might	limit	or	expand	the	“field	of	critique	and	analy-sis”	(Caplan	&	boyd,	2016,	p.11)	at	the	heart	of	the	online	public	sphere.	Without	downplaying	the	very	real	benefit	that	the	blockbot	served	for	many,	we	further	argue	that	 the	 attitudes	 and	perceptions	of	 videogame	developers	 toward	ggautoblocker	 represent	 two	underlying	anxieties	that	reflect,	more	broadly,	a	lack	of	firm	positionality	in	a	still	nascent	online	public	sphere.	The	first	anxiety	rests	in	the	merger	of	offline	and	online	life,	and	the	second	rests	in	fragmenting	control	over	information	gatekeeping	that	undergirds	the	structure	of	the	online	pub-lic	sphere.		
Twitter	blockbots:	An	industry	blacklist?		Firstly,	 in	 the	 comments	we	 categorized	under	 “Blacklisted	 from	employment,”	 participants	 indi-cated	that	they	felt	there	was	a	connection	between	being	placed	on	ggautoblocker’s	list	and	dimin-ishing	prospects	of	new	and	future	employment.	While	ggautoblocker	was	decidedly	not	the	same	thing	as	an	industry	blacklist,	the	prospect	that	it	might	function	as	one	created	a	sense	of	unease	
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amongst	participants	 in	our	 sample.	We	believe	 that	 a	 strong	anxiety	underlying	 this	 fear	of	 em-ployment	 blacklisting	 lies	 in	 a	 recognition	 that	 any	 meaningful	 distinction	 between	 an	 online	sphere	and	an	offline	sphere	is	quickly	disappearing.	A	fundamental	construct	of	contemporary	life	is	the	elision	of	offline	with	online	life,	a	construct	that	Mary	Chayko	(2017)	refers	to	as	techno-social	life.	Of	course,	the	integration	of	these	two	pre-viously	 distinct	 spheres	 is	 not	 apparent	 to	 some	 and	 is	 still	 actively	 resisted	 by	 others.	 This	 re-sistance	is	what	media	theorist	Nathan	Jurgenson	(2011)	refers	to	as	digital	dualism,	a	term	Chayko	(2017)	defines	as	an	“artificial	and	unnecessary	separation	of	realms	that	are	actually	enmeshed”	(p.	66).	In	an	industry	that	heavily	relies	on	digital	spaces	and	thus	online	environments	for	both	work	and	play,	the	videogame	industry	is	sure	to	be	one	of	the	first	sectors	to	viscerally	feel	the	gap	be-tween	online	and	offline	life	closing	in.	The	reality	is	that	one’s	behavior	online	undoubtedly	follows	them	offline	and	this	places	pressure	on	both	self-presentation	and	online	reputation	in	a	relatively	new	way.	Thus,	the	disdain	for	ggautoblocker	reflects	anxiety	over	the	still	amorphous	structure	of	not	totally	separate	but	not	completely	entwined	spheres.		
What’s	the	guilt	in	association?	
	As	a	result	of	the	broad	reach	of	ggautoblocker,	many	accounts	peripheral	to	the	more	coordinated	attacks	were	 included	on	the	 list,	such	as	the	IGDA’s	own	Puerto	Rico	chairman,	Roberto	Rosario.	When	Rosario	challenged	his	inclusion,	Harper	responded:						 If	 the	 Puerto	 Rico	 chairman	 of	 IGDF	 [sic]	 didn’t	 want	 to	 be	 on	 the	 blocklist,	 he	 probably	shouldn’t	have	followed	known	harassers	of	women.	(Harper,	@freebsdgirl,	2014).					The	conflict	illustrates	a	compelling	tension.	Following	someone	on	Twitter	does	not	mean	that	you	agree	with	his	or	her	views.	Following	is,	most	simply,	an	admission	of	your	desire	to	be	aware	of	their	speech.		It	is	an	offering	of	your	attention,	whether	you	agree	with	the	speaker	or	not.	Howev-er,	it	also	contributes	quantitatively	to	someone’s	“following,”	and	we	have	yet	to	truly	understand	how	much	a	large	following	lends	legitimacy	to	a	person’s	speech,	to	community	members,	to	pass-ersby’s,	and	to	newcomers.	This	raises	an	important	question;	in	an	environment	where	everyone	has	the	capacity	to	speak,	what	legitimacy	does	our	attention	lend	to	abusive	speech	in	social	media	spaces?			
Censorship:	Is	refusing	to	listen	tantamount	to	silencing?		These	claims	of	censorship	raise	unique	questions	about	 the	algorithmic	structuring	of	 the	public	sphere	because	they	reflect	a	concern	over	the	automating	and	outsourcing	of	gatekeeping	practic-es	among	community	members.	While	it	is	common	for	charges	of	censorship	to	be	hurled	at	media	companies	and	governments,	the	claims	of	censorship	over	a	user-created	and	community	shared	blockbot	represent	an	interesting	departure	from	this.	It	invites	us	to	grapple	with	questions	of	au-thority,	 power,	 and	 control	 over	 the	 fields	 of	 online	 debate.	 In	models	 of	 communication	where	governments	and	media	corporations	are	central	in	managing	information	flow,	citizens	themselves	have	typically	acted	as	recipients.	User-generated	blockbots	change	the	role	that	individual	citizens	can	potentially	play	in	shaping	the	field	of	public	debate.	This	undermines	traditional	gatekeeping	processes	 and	 confounds	 the	 dynamics	 of	 power	 concerning	which	 stakeholders	 can	 and	 should	shape	the	public	sphere.		Indeed,	much	of	the	anger	present	in	claims	of	censorship	seemed	to	stem	from	the	belief	that	the	IGDA	and	creator	Randi	Harper	had	no	legitimate	authority	to	curate	online	
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information.	It	speaks,	we	think,	to	an	acute	anxiety	about	this	fragmenting	control,	the	potential	to	shape	the	field	of	discussion	in	one’s	own	interest,	and	the	potential	power	that	implies.		In	its	operation,	ggautoblocker	was	not	radically	distinct	from	other	forms	of	online	curation.	Al-gorithms	with	 important	 curatorial	 functions	 underscore	 social	media	 platforms	 such	 as	 Twitter	and	Facebook.	These	algorithms	work	to	match	the	content	we	see	to	our	preferences	and	demon-strated	 browsing	 habits.	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 these	 processes	 have	 important	 implications	 for	public	deliberation;	they	surreptitiously	insert	digital	borders	in	a	way	that	erodes	any	reality	of	an	“open”	and	“neutral”	internet,	despite	the	persistence	of	this	myth	(Caplan	and	boyd,	2016).	Due	to	the	proprietary	commercial	function	of	social	media	algorithms,	these	operations	are	typ-ically	veiled	from	public	view,	“play[ing]	out	behind	an	opaque	screen”	(Caplan	and	boyd,	2016,	p.9).	Furthermore,	because	 they	are	 “designed	 to	give	users	what	 they	want”	 (Caplan	and	boyd,	2016,	p.10),	the	preference-driven	algorithms	that	guide	individual	social	media	experiences	feel	mecha-nistic,	or,	at	 the	very	 least,	benign	 in	 their	politics.	As	Caplan	and	boyd	(2016)	argue,	 “the	results	[are]	presented	 to	us	as	 the	 function	of	 [technical]	processes,	 instead	of	social	and	political	ones”	(p.9).	This	is	assuming,	of	course,	that	they	are	noticed	at	all.	These	digital	borders	don’t	often	in-voke	cries	of	 censorship,	because	 they	are	not	perceived	 to	suppress	content,	but	 instead	elevate	what	 is	desired.	 	That	said,	since	the	2016	US	election	there	has	been	a	growing	debate	about	the	impact	 of	 social	media	 algorithms	 in	 siloing	different	political	 perspectives.	 Interestingly,	 our	 ex-ample	predates	 this	debate	by	 two	years,	and	 is	unique	 in	 that	 it	was	a	user-based	 initiative,	and	reflects	socio-political	priorities	of	users	instead	of	the	profit-driven	priorities	of	platforms.		We	 argue	 that	 the	 anger	 present	 in	 our	 data	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 moment	 when	 the	 videogame	community	was	directly	confronted	with	 these	processes	and	their	 implications.	Dependent	upon	who	deploys	them	and	to	what	end,	these	processes	can	quickly	and	radically	alter	the	field	of	de-bate.	As	our	findings	suggest,	many	participants	felt	the	ggautoblocker	indeed	limited	the	“field	of	critique	and	analysis,”	as	is	illustrated	by	their	cries	of	censorship	(Caplan	&	boyd,	2016,	p.11).	This	brings	up	important	questions	about	whose	responsibility	it	is	to	listen	and	engage	in	debate	prop-er,	and	when	is	it	appropriate	to	ignore	or	withdraw	one’s	attention?		As	Van	Winkle	(2014)	writes:		 It	is	not	an	inalienable	right	to	be	able	to	contact	people	you	disagree	with	on	Twitter	in	the	name	of	making	 sure	 both	 sides	 of	 an	 argument	 are	 heard.	 Individuals	 have	 every	 right	 to	have	control	over	who	they	interact	with.		 (para.	13)		Those	angered	by	ggautoblocker	expressed	a	variety	of	concerns,	chief	among	them,	however,	was	the	belief	that	people	should	be	granted	access	to	the	online	public	sphere	without	having	to	bend	to	others.			
Conclusion	and	Future	Work		In	the	end,	the	ggautoblocker	represents	a	complex	moment	in	digital	culture,	one	with	contradic-tory	 implications	 for	 participation	 in	 the	 public	 sphere.	 It	 was	 a	 moment	 of	 jarring	 recognition,	brought	on	by	the	unapologetically	political	intention	of	this	blockbot.	It	was	not	opaque	in	its	op-eration.	It	was	well	known,	and	stated	in	the	public	description	of	the	list,	how	it	operated.	The	list	itself	was	also	public.	In	this	way,	the	values	behind	ggautoblocker	were	laid	bare	from	the	outset.	Unlike	most	algorithms,	it	did	not	present	itself	as	a	mechanistic	process.	It	was	experienced	as	so-cial	 and	political	 from	 the	 beginning,	 and	was	 overwhelmingly	 resented	 for	 it. As	we	 continue	 to	reflect	on	 the	data	and	relevant	 literature,	we	believe	 future	 research	should	 interrogate	debates	
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around	who	controls	the	online	public	sphere,	who	should	control	it,	and	what	constitutes	proper	participation	within	it. 	
Notes		1.	Authors’	 names	 appear	 in	 alphabetical	 order.	Both	 authors	 contributed	 equally	 to	 this	article.		2.	danah	boyd	publishes	work	using	lower	cases	letter	in	her	name.		3.	Secondary	codes	acted	as	sub-themes	to	the	30	primary	codes.	For	example,	for	the	pri-mary	code	“solution”	(which	indicated	any	time	someone	recommended	a	solution	for	di-versifying	the	work	force)	we	had	a	variety	of	secondary	codes	to	help	further	explain	the	themes	 that	 emerged,	 such	 as	 “education	 and	 mentorship,”	 “community	 outreach,”	 and	“change	recruitment	norms,”	to	name	a	few.		4.	We	did	not	quantify	the	codes	in	such	a	way	to	assess	a	reliability	percentage.	Quantifica-tion	took	place	only	after	the	coding	was	completed,	and	only	to	the	extent	that	we	could	say,	for	instance,	13%	of	the	total	comments	were	coded	under	“blacklisted	from	employ-ment”.			
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